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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

Case No. 950521-CA

:
Priority No. 2

BRYAN O. RASMUSSEN,

:
Oral Argument Not Requested

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Bryan O. Rasmussen appeals the enhanced penalties imposed
upon his convictions for three counts of burglary, a third degree felony, and two counts
of theft, also third degree felonies. The underlying convictions, plus the enhancements,
for "acting in concert with two or more persons," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
(1995), were entered upon guilty pleas in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. This Court has appellate
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which enhances penalties for
crimes committed in concert with two or more other persons, a legitimate sentencing
statute, which does not require full trial-type procedures in order to apply?

2. Does section 76-3-203.1: (a) comply with Utah's constitutional
"uniform operation of laws" provision? (b) comply with state "due process"
principles? (c) comply with federal "equal protection of law" principles?
3. Does section 76-3-203.1: (a) give adequate notice of the conditions
that trigger its application? (b) honor First Amendment "association" rights?
As a threshold matter, this Court must determine de novo whether the
foregoing issues were properly preserved for appeal by presentation to die trial court,
and if not preserved, whetfier some exception to the rule of waiver by default applies.
See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820
P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991). The preserved issues, questioning die
constitutionality of a statute, are reviewed on appeal witiiout deference to die trial
court. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989). However, great
deference is due to the legislature; doubts about the constitutionality of a statute are
resolved in favor of statutory validity. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995);
State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The challenged sentence enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1 (1995), is copied in appendix I of this brief. The various constitutional
provisions and statutes invoked by Rasmussen are copied in his Brief of Appellant, at 16. They will be referenced as necessary in the text of this brief.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Rasmussen and two codefendants were charged with four counts of
burglary and four counts of theft, third and second degree felonies, respectively (R. 711). In the criminal information setting forth those charges, the State served notice of
intention to request sentence enhancements, as provided under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1 (1995), because several of the charged offenses were "committed in concert with
two or more persons" (R. 8-9). Enhancements for "in concert" crimes under section
76-3-203.1 are commonly called "gang enhancements," although the statute contains no
reference to "gangs."
Rasmussen waived preliminary hearing and was bound over to district
court (R. 3). There, he moved to strike the "in concert" enhancement, alleging four
constitutional defects in section 76-3-203.1: (1) that the statute inadequately channels
prosecutorial and judicial discretion; (2) that the statute fails to rationally advance its
purpose; (3) that it "impinges on various rights unique to criminal defendants"; and (4)
that the statute is vague (R. 22). Upon review of the parties' memoranda, the trial
court denied Rasmussen's motion to strike the "in concert" enhancement (R. 40, 53-54,
80-86). The court then accepted Rasmussen's guilty pleas to three of the burglary and
two of the theft charges (R. 40). With the State's and the trial court's consent,
Rasmussen reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the "in concert"

3

enhancement statute on appeal (R. 42). See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
1988); Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i). 1
A presentence evaluation and a sentencing hearing followed (R. 103-12).
The trial court sentenced Rasmussen to concurrent zero-to-five year sentences on the
three burglaries, but with the third of those counts enhanced, under the "in concert"
statute, to three to five years; enhanced concurrent, three-to-five year sentences were
also imposed for the two theft charges, those sentences to run consecutively to the
burglary sentences (R. 60-67, 109-10).2 Thus the net effect was that Rasmussen was
sentenced to two consecutive enhanced sentences of three to five years on his guilty
pleas.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The burglaries and thefts were committed at several Salt Lake City
businesses in autumn of 1994 (R. 7-10). The crimes appear to have been systematically
planned, for some of the stolen property was cached in a storage unit rented to one of
Rasmussen's codefendants (Hofftnan) under a false name (R. 12). Another codefendant

1

One of Rasmussen's codefendants, Christopher Cheeney, is similarly challenging the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1 on appeal. State v. Cheeney, No. 950720-CA
(Br. of Appellant filed 16 February 1996; Br. of Appelleefiled02 April 1996).
Effective 01 May 1995, the value of property stolen was raisedfrom$1000.00 to
$5000.00 in order for theft to be a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp.
1995). The parties agreed that Rasmussen stole property valued between $1000.00 and
$5000.00, and therefore agreed, at sentencing, to reduce the theft offense levelsfromsecond
to third degree felonies (R. 57).
4

(Cheeney) confessed his involvement in the thefts and burglaries, naming Rasmussen
and another (Hoffman) as co-perpetrators (R. 12). When he pleaded guilty, Rasmussen
admitted that he acted "as a party to" the offenses (R. 43-45, 94-96), thereby admitting
the factual predicate for the section 76-3-203.1 "in concert" sentence enhancement. On
appeal, Rasmussen pursues his challenge to the "in concert" enhancement statute.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The "in concert" enhancement does not create a new substantive
offense. When compared with a similar sentence enhancement statute that was upheld
against a similar "due process" challenge by the United States Supreme Court, section
76-3.203.1 also passes constitutional muster. Portions of Rasmussen's arguments to the
contrary, including his bid for distinctive state constitutional analysis, are not properly
before this Court, because he did not present them to the trial court. The statute is a
valid sentence enhancer that does not require trial-type proceedings to apply.
2. Section 76-3-203.1 also satisfies state due process review. The statute
enhances penalties for crimes committed in concert with two or more others. Because
group crimes are more harmful than solo crimes, the statute rationally serves the
legitimate purpose to more severely punish more harmful crimes, satisfying state due
process as defined by the Utah Supreme Court. Rasmussen's due process "vagueness"
allegation fails because it is based upon an inappropriate attempt to graft legislative
debates about "gang" crime into the statute, which is unambiguous on its face.
5

Rasmussen's federal "equal protection" and state "uniform operation of laws"
arguments are not preserved for appellate review.
3. The "in concert" enhancement is not vague. The statute clearly
defines "in concert" criminal conduct, which does not require proof that the defendant
had a mens rea beyond that required for the predicate offense(s). The statute guides
judicial discretion in its application, creating a permissible, rebuttable presumption that
once the "in concert" facts are found, the enhancement will apply. Finally, the statute
does not violate the First Amendment, because it only applies if both the defendant and
the co-perpetrators are guilty of criminal conduct; therefore, the statute cannot infringe
upon any constitutionally protected "associational" conduct.
ARGUMENT
Overview: Parameters of Review for
Rasmussen ys Constitutional Challenges
Rasmussen raises numerous constitutional challenges to Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-203.1 (1995), the "in concert" enhancement statute under which he was
sentenced. Several basic principles govern the analysis on appeal.
First, arguments not made in the trial courts, even constitutionally based
ones, are waived on appeal absent a showing of "plain error" or "exceptional
circumstances." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991). Similarly, arguments that Utah
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courts should depart from federal interpretations in analyzing claims under analogous
state constitutional provisions are also waived if such arguments were not articulated in
the trial court. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus
granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911
(1992); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). In this case,
Rasmussen has failed to preserve some of his constitutional challenges. Additionally,
Rasmussen's trial court memorandum supporting his motion to strike the "in concert"
statute (R. 22-28, copied in appendix II of this brief), articulated no reason to interpret
Utah constitutional provisions differently from their federal analogues.
Next, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will not
be stricken unless proven invalid beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d
390, 397-98 (Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). That
proof burden is even heavier when a statute is attacked as facially unconstitutional,
rather than unconstitutional as applied in the case at bar. A facial challenge requires
proof that no circumstances can exist in which the statute could validly apply. See
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). It therefore follows that if a
challenger cannot show that a statute was unconstitutionally applied in the case at bar, a
facial challenge cannot succeed. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). In this case, Rasmussen argues broadly that

7

the "in concert" enhancement is unconstitutional, indicating facial challenges. He fails
to prove either facial or a as applied" defects.
POINT ONE
THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS A
LEGITIMATE SENTENCE ENHANCER THAT DOES
NOT REQUIRE FULL TRIAL PROCEDURES TO APPLY
In his first challenge to the "in concert" enhancement statute, Rasmussen
argues that section 76-3-203.1 creates a new crime. Therefore, his reasoning goes, in
order for the statute to apply, the "in concert" element must be decided at a trial at
which full constitutional protections-jury trial, witness confrontation, proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and so on-are followed (Br. of Appellant at 11-23). Rasmussen's
argument is based upon federal and state "due process." Because his trial court
memorandum did not advocate differing analyses under these analogous provisions, the
federal analysis applies.
The relevant federal case is McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79
(1986). In McMillan, the United States Supreme Court rejected a due process-based
challenge to Pennsylvania's "firearm enhancement" statute, which provides enhanced
penalties for certain predicate crimes when the sentencing judge, unaided by a jury,
finds that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" while committing the crime. The
Court also held that visible firearm possession under the enhancement statute only
requires proof by the "preponderance of evidence" standard. 477 U.S. at 91-92. The
8

Utah Supreme Court has approvingly cited McMillan in a case upholding another type
of sentence enhancement statute. See State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1989)
(approving enhancement for dealing drugs within 1000 feet of a public school). Utah's
"in concert" statute similarly enhances the sentence for certain crimes committed "in
concert with" two or more other persons, as found by the trial court after the defendant
is found guilty of the predicate crime(s). Under McMillan, this Court should reject
Rasmussen's argument that section 76-3-203.1 creates a new substantive offense, which
must be proven by full trial-type procedures and proof burdens.
A,

Section 76-3-203.1 Closely Resembles the "Firearm Enhancement"
Statute that Was Upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
The Utah Legislature has expressly declared that the "in concert"

enhancement "does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty
for the primary offense." Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203. l(5)(a) (1995). In McMillan, All
U.S. at 84-86, a similar disclaimer in the Pennsylvania firearm enhancement statute
was upheld under due process review. For reasons similar to those underpinning the
McMillan holding, this Court should honor the disclaimer in section 76-3-203.1.
Upholding the firearm enhancement in McMillan, the United States
Supreme Court took note of several features that made Pennsylvania's statute a
legitimate sentence enhancer, rather than a statute that defined a new offense. Utah's
"in concert" statute shares those same features. Like the Pennsylvania statute in

9

McMillan, All U.S. at 87, Utah's section 76-3-203.1 only applies once the defendant is
found guilty of an enumerated predicate offense in subsection (4). Like Pennsylvania's
statute, 477 U.S. at 87, section 76-3-203.1 creates no defendant-adverse factual
presumptions; instead, the prosecution must first establish guilt of the predicate crime,
and then prove the "in concert" factor. Like Pennsylvania's statute, 477 U.S. at 87-88,
Utah's statute only raises the minimum punishment for the predicate offenses, as set
forth in subsection (3); it does not raise the maximum punishment above the normally
prescribed ranges.3
Finally, just as Pennsylvania's statute requires consideration of firearm
possession as a traditional crime "instrumentality" factor at sentencing, 477 U.S. at 89,
so too does section 76-3-203.1 merely require consideration of one of the many
"circumstances of the crime" that traditionally are considered in criminal sentencing.
A crime committed in concert with others constitutes a more serious circumstance,
warranting greater punishment than a solo crime. The logic of this is straightforward:
group crimes cause more harm and distress than solo crimes. The harm caused by any
crime is a legitimate sentencing factor. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 113 S.
Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993). In this case, it can readily be inferred that, aided by his coperpetrators, Rasmussen was able to steal more property more quickly than he could

^Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995) (Utah's "dangerous weapon"
enhancement, which adds consecutive penalty to predicate crime penalty, requires finding by
"the trier of fact").
10

have acting alone. Therefore, just as the federal Supreme Court upheld the
enhancement statute in McMillan, so too should this Court uphold Utah's section 76-3203.1 as a valid sentencing statute.
B.

Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Permit "Perfunctory" Decisions on
"Complicated" Matters.
The firearm enhancement in McMillan involved a "simple,

straightforward issue susceptible of objective proof." 477 U.S. at 84. Rasmussen
argues that Utah's "in concert" finding "involves complicated determinations of the
intent of other individuals . . . (Br. of Appellant at 14). Therefore, he argues, the "in
concert" finding requires full trial-type proceedings. If left to the sentencing court,
Rasmussen suggests, the "in concert" finding will only be made in "perfunctory"
fashion (id.). This argument fails, under both "as applied" and "facial" analysis.
Rasmussen cannot show that section 76-3-203.1 was unconstitutionally
applied in this case, because when pleading guilty, and later during sentencing, he
conceded that the "in concert" finding was satisfied (R. 93-96 (admitting that he acted
"as a party to" the offenses); R. 105 (agreeing that enhancement applies)). "[B]efore a
party can challenge the constitutionality of a statute, he must be adversely affected by
its operation." State v. Mohiy 901 P.2d 991, 1005 (Utah 1995). Because Rasmussen
never submitted the "in concert" issue and the intent of his co-perpetrators to any

11

adversarial testing, he cannot complain that the issue would have been perfunctorily
decided, or too complicated for the trial court to decide, in his case.
Because Rasmussen cannot prove an "as applied" constitutional defect in
section 76-3-203.1, he also cannot prove that the statute is facially invalid. Nor could
he prove a facial defect in any event. True, proof of the "in concert" facts is not as
simple as proof that a firearm was used to commit an offense. However, Rasmussen
cites no authority to support his apparent premise that "complicated" issues can only be
decided by full trial-type proceedings. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984) (rejecting argument that was unsupported by analysis or authority). In
fact, trial judges often decide complicated issues: admission of evidence under hearsay
and confrontation rules, balancing relevance against unfair prejudice, and Fourth
Amendment exclusion decisions are just a few examples. With respect to sentencing,
federal trial judges apply the highly complex federal sentencing guidelines, again
without full trial-type procedures; those guidelines and procedures for their application
have been upheld against constitutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v.
Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993).
Bearing this in mind, Utah's "in concert" statute does not strain the
capabilities of state sentencing judges. The statute only requires that after a guilt
determination on the predicate offense(s), it be shown that the defendant acted with
others who would also be criminally liable for the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-312

203. l(l)(b) (1995). The mens rea for such co-perpetrators need not match that of the
defendant at bar; only some minimally criminal mental state need be proven. State v.
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994). Just as they often decide complicated
factual and evidentiary issues, trial judges often decide issues of mental state without
full trial-type procedures. See, e.g., State v. Carter 888 P.2d 629, 641 (Utah)
(voluntariness of confession), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995); State

v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah App. 1991) (voluntariness of search consent),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(10) & -(11)
(1995) (competency to proceed to trial). Clearly, the "in concert" finding is not too
"complicated" to be decided by sentencing judges.
Rasmussen's claim that the "in conceit" enhancement statute permits
"perfunctory" decisions also lacks merit. On their face, subsections 76-3-203.l(l)(b)
and -(5)(c) specifically direct the sentencing judge to find that the co-perpetrators would
be criminally liable as parties to the predicate offense committed by the defendant at
bar, and to reduce that finding to writing. If the judge opts to suspend the
enhancement, he or she must, under subsection (6), state the reasons therefor in
writing. Thus the statute facially requires careful, articulated factfinding and
reasoning; "perfunctory" application is not permitted.
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C.

Section 76-3-203.1 Legitimately Contains No "Beyond Reasonable
Doubt" Requirement.
This Court should also reject Rasmussen's argument that "the risk of

erroneous fact-finding" requires that the facts necessary for the "in concert"
enhancement be proven beyond reasonable doubt (Br. of Appellant at 15). Once more,
because Rasmussen acquiesced in the "in concert" finding, the trial court was never
required to decide the level of proof. Therefore, no "as applied" error can be found.
Also, as a facial matter, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
same argument in McMillan, observing that once found guilty of an offense, a criminal
defendant "has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State
may confine him." 477 U.S. at 92 & n.8 (quoting authority). See also State v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988) (upon adjudication of guilt, "[t]he
defendant's right to liberty is not in issue because he will be confined . . . " ) .
"Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any
prescribed burden of proof at all." McMillan, 411 U.S. at 91 (citing authority).
Therefore, a decision about the precise sentence within the statutorily-prescribed range
only requires a "preponderance of evidence" standard. Id.
The predicate offenses to which Rasmussen pleaded guilty authorized the
State to incarcerate him from zero to five years. Rasmussen had no legal expectation of
a sentence in the low end of that range. See State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah
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1981). The "in concert" enhancement merely raised his minimum sentence within that
range. It would have been proper, therefore, to equally allocate the risk of an
erroneous "in concert" finding between Rasmussen and the State, by using the
"preponderance" proof standard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-29
(1979) (degrees of proof allocate risk of error between the parties) {cited in McMillan,
All U.S. at 92 n.8). Therefore, Utah's "in concert" enhancement does not require the
"beyond reasonable doubt" proof standard, which only rarely, if ever, applies outside
of substantive guilt determinations. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428; cf. Osborn v.
Schillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610, 619 (D. Wyo. 1986) (capital penalty phase does not
require proof beyond reasonable doubt), aff'd, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988).
D.

Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Give Rise to an Impermissible "Tail
Wagging the Dog" Situation.
In McMillan, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are due process

limits, albeit not easily defined, to a State's ability to designate certain criminal
proceedings as "sentencing" rather than as definitions of substantive crimes. 477 U.S.
at 86, 91. Borrowing a metaphor from McMillan, id. at 88, Rasmussen argues that
Utah's "in concert" enhancement transgresses those limits, and is "the tail that wags
the dog" of the predicate offense (Br. of Appellant at 15). This happens, he explains,
because the enhancement requires findings that at least two others were parties to the
predicate offense committed by the defendant at bar. Therefore, he concludes, a[t]wo
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thirds of the required facts" are impermissibly taken from a jury, and delegated to the
sentencing judge (Br. of Appellant at 15).
Once more, Rasmussen is ill-positioned to claim that Utah's "in concert"
enhancement was unconstitutionally applied to him in the foregoing manner. In the
trial court, he never demanded a factfinding procedure of any nature, by jury or
otherwise, for his own guilt or that of his co-perpetrators. Instead, by pleading guilty
and then stipulating to application of the "in concert" enhancement, Rasmussen
conceded the existence of all the necessary facts-both for his own guilt and that of his
co-perpetrators. Therefore, it is not necessary to speculate whether on its face, the
statute's factfinding procedures are insufficiently strict.
Such facial argument would fail. While Rasmussen makes creative use of
the "tail wagging" metaphor, he does not support his argument with authority. Settled
practice rejects Rasmussen's apparent underlying belief that the question whether a
factual issue must be decided by a judge or by a jury depends upon a simple tally of
how many discrete facts must be decided. Sentencing courts traditionally consider
numerous facts besides those constituting the predicate offense. See Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949). Consistent with this tradition of broad sentencing
inquiry, Utah's presentence reports compile facts about damages caused by a crime,
plus the defendant's social, educational, and work history, and so forth, to help decide
the sentence. The facts thus compiled can far outnumber the facts constituting the
16

crime for which sentence is to be pronounced, yet no court has suggested that such
facts must be decided by full trial-type proceedings (at least not in noncapital cases).
Rasmussen's argument also breaks down when applied only to the facts
constituting the defendant's and the co-perpetrators' criminal liability under Utah's "in
concert" enhancement. By implication of his argument, the tail would not wag the dog
if most of the required facts were decided by full trial-type proceedings. Therefore, so
long as the defendant at bar and only one co-perpetrator were found guilty by such
proceedings, it would be permissible to find another co-perpetrator's liability at
sentencing proceedings.4 There is no rational justification for such a rule.
E.

Rasmussen's Independent State Constitutional Argument Is Not
Preserved for Appellate Consideration.
Rasmussen finally argues that even if section 76-3-203.1 satisfies federal

due process standards as a sentencing provision, this Court should declare that under
the Utah Constitution, the "in concert" enhancement is really a new substantive offense
(Br. of Appellant at 16-23). This argument should be summarily rejected, because
Rasmussen never argued for diverging state and federal constitutional analyses on this
point in the trial court. Instead, he merely cited various Utah constitutional provisions
in his trial court memorandum attacking the enhancement statute (R. 22-28 (appendix II
4

In effect, this happened in this case. Rasmussen's codefendant and co-perpetrator,
Cheeney, pleaded guilty to theft and burglary involving the same incidents. Therefore, two
thirds of the required facts were established by proceedings prior to sentencing, and the tail
does not wag the dog in this case.
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of this brief)). It is settled that such nominal allusion to state constitutional provisions
fails to satisfy the trial-level preservation requirement. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 830
P.2d 310, 312 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
Briefly, Rasmussen's argument for more defendant-favorable treatment
under the Utah Constitution would be properly denied on its merits. His contention
that federal law on this point is "unworkable" (Br. of Appellant at 16-18), based on
assertedly contradictory results in Mullaney v. Wilbur, All U.S. 684 (1975), and
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), does not aid him in attacking the penalty
enhancement question presented in this case. Mullaney and Patterson involved
challenges to proof burden allocation regarding the mens rea element of substantive
offenses. See McMillan, All U.S. at 84-85 (explaining Mullaney and Patterson). Even
assuming that those cases reached inconsistent results, they are distinguishable from the
penalty enhancement situations in McMillan and in this case for the simple reason that
the former cases clearly involved proof of substantive criminal guilt. In contrast, the
penalty enhancement question does not arise until after guilt of a predicate crime has
been established; it therefore does not invade any finding that, as a matter of
fundamental tradition, McMillan, All U.S. at 85 (quoting authority), might be deemed
the province of the trier of substantive guilt. Therefore, the asserted confusion caused
by Mullaney and Patterson does not extend to the sentence enhancement situation in
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this case, and does not justify a different result (which would clearly contradict express
legislative intent) in the construction of section 76-3-203.1.
Rasmussen's federal due process-based argument fails on its merits; his
state constitutional argument is not preserved for appeal. Therefore, this Court should
reject, in toto, Rasmussen's claim that section 76-3-203.1 defines an offense. The
statute is a valid sentencing enhancement. As such, only the rudimentary due process
required at sentencing hearings is required for the "in concert" enhancment to apply.
See State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978) ("the basic provisions afforded by
our law to persons accused of crime do not exist in the same manner after he has been
convicted"); State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988) (sentencing under "minimum
mandatory" statutes entails a relatively informal procedure).
POINT TWO
THE "IN CONCERT" SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT
REASONABLY ADVANCES A LEGITIMATE
PURPOSE, AND GIVES PROPER NOTICE OF ITS
APPLICABILITY
In his second point on appeal, Rasmussen argues that section 76-3-203.1
violates state due process, state uniform operation of laws, and federal equal protection
principles. See Utah Const. Art. I § 7, Art I § 24; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1. At
no point in the trial court did Rasmussen articulate any argument under federal equal
protection or state uniform operation of laws principles (see R. 22-28 (appendix II of
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this brief)). Because he does not claim any exception to the rule of waiver by default,
those arguments cannot now be considered on appeal. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,
1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991).5
Rasmussen did preserve his state due process argument in the trial court,
by citing State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), a state due process decision,
and by reciting the "rational advancement of legitimate purpose" state due process test
set forth in it (R. 24 (appendix II of this brief)). Therefore, the State addresses the
state due process portion of this point on the merits.
A.

The Enhancement Satisfies State Due Process "Rational Service of
Legitimate Purpose."
In Copeland, the Utah Supreme Court struck two statutory requirements

for committing a "guilty but mentally ill" criminal defendant to a psychiatric hospital
instead of prison. 765 P.2d at 1270-72. The stricken requirements had been imported
from Utah's civil commitment statute. The court held that those requirements were
"irrelevant" to the decision whether to imprison or hospitalize the offender, and
therefore not "rationally related" to the interests served by the "guilty but mentally ill"
commitment statute. Id. at 1271, 1272. The court pronounced those provisions

5

Rasmussen implicitly argues that he preserved all constitutional challenges to section
76-3-203.1 by his motion to strike the enhancement statute (Br. of Appellant at 7). The
problem is that by not alerting the trial court to some of the specific constitutional defects that
he now alleges on appeal, Rasmussen deprived the trial court of the first opportunity to
address those alleged defects. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
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"arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 1272.6 The state due process test for a statute's
legitimacy, drawn from Copeland, is simply that the statute rationally relate to a
legitimate purpose, or that it not be "arbitrary and capricious.* This is an easily
satisfied standard, and properly so, given the strong presumption that statutes are
constitutional. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). Utah's "in concert"
statute satisfies this standard. As explained in Point One of this brief, group crimes
cause more harm than solo crimes. Therefore, it is rational to more severely punish
somebody who commits a crime with the assistance of two or more other criminals.
Accordingly, section 76-3-203.1 satisfies Utah due process requirements.
B.

Section 76-3-203.1 Provides Traditional Due Process "Notice."
Rasmussen's major complaint under this point is not that the "in concert"

enhancement fails to rationally serve a legitimate purpose. He complains that the
enhancement statute's language does not reveal its true purpose, and further, that the
statute is often applied to situations not related to that purpose. Thus he is really

6

Ironically, the result in Copeland may have made the "guilty but mentally ill"
commitment statute less firm under federal due process scrutiny. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980), the federal Supreme Court held that prisoners have a "liberty interest" against
involuntary transfer to mental health facilities, contrary to the view expressed in Copeland,
765 P.2d at 1271 ("the defendant's liberty is not in issue . . . " ) ; therefore, careful due process
must be observed to prevent an improper transfer. The statutory provisions stricken in
Copeland helped to protect against improper psychiatric commitment of a prisoner: one
provision required proof that the defendant could not rationally decide whether he or she
needed treatment; the other required proof that there was no appropriate treatment other than
psychiatric hospitalization. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271.
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alleging a due process "notice" defect. See, e.g., Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (statutes must accurately describe prohibited conduct).
The alleged defect arises from Rasmussen's contention that the "in
concert" enhancement is actually intended to "target members of criminal street
gangs"; however, in practice the Enhancement "is widely applied to non-gangmembers"
(Br. of Appellant at 25, 27). Rasmussen's complaint is founded upon his recitation of
legislative debates about the statute, which reveal a concern about criminal "gangs"
(Br. of Appellant at 25-26 & addendum A). There is no record evidence that
Rasmussen belongs to such a "gang." Therefore, his argument goes, Rasmussen was
not on notice that the "in concert" enhancement would apply to him.
Constitutional due process analysis is not necessary to resolve this claim.
Instead, Rasmussen's complaint fails by operation of two basic rules of statutory
construction.
First, when a statute's text is unambiguous, the use of legislative history
to interpret the statute is unnecessary and inappropriate. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881
P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah 1994). The text of section 76-3-203.1 is unambiguous.
Subsection (l)(a) plainly provides that a crime committed in concert with two or ijiore
other persons is subject to the enhanced penalty. It contains no reference to "gangs,"
and makes no effort to criminalize or specially punish "gang" membership. Compare
Cal. Penal Code §§ 186.20 through -.28 (West Supp. 1996) (Br. of Appellant
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addendum B) (repeated reference to "street gangs," with apparent creation of
freestanding substantive offense in subsection 186.22(a)). Utah's statute then defines
"in concert" action, in subsection (l)(b); explains the process for applying the
enhancement, in subsections (2), (5)(c), and (6); lists the precise enhancements, in
subsection (3); and lists the specific offenses to which the enhancement applies, in
subsection (4). All these subsections are likewise devoid of "gang" references. The
legislature's concern about "gangs" (actually the concern of the quoted legislators), is
therefore irrelevant for interpreting section 76-3-203.1. The statute plainly enhances
penalties for crimes committed "in concert" with others, regardless whether "gang"
affiliation is present.
Second, statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional problems,
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). By asking this Court to engraft a "gang"
prohibition into section 76-3-203.1, Rasmussen is attempting to create constitutional
problems-not only of vagueness in the difficult task of defining "gangs," but also a
possibility of threatening First Amendment "associational" rights. This Court should
decline Rasmussen's invitation to create constitutional flaws in section 76-3-203.1. By
its plain language, the statute enhances punishment for crimes committed in concert
with two or more other persons. Nothing more (and nothing less) may be read into it.
Thus properly interpreted, section 76-3-203.1 gives adequate notice of the kind of
criminal conduct that is subject to an "in concert" penalty enhancement.
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POINT THREE
THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS
NOT VAGUE, AND DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
In his final point on appeal, Rasmussen contends that section 76-3-203.1
"is void for vagueness under a federal due process analysis" (Br. of Appellant at 31).
This last contention is partially founded upon some arguments by Rasmussen that have
been previously discussed in this brief. Those arguments failed; so too do Rasmussen's
final "vagueness" contentions fail.
A.

Section 76-3-203.1 Adequately Defines "In Concert.5'
Rasmussen argues that section 76-3-203.1 fails to adequately define "in

concert." Subsection (l)(b) of the statute defines "in concert" by reference to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995), Utah's "party liability" statute, and requires that the
defendant's co-perpetrators act in a manner that would make them also criminally liable
for the defendant's criminal conduct. As construed in State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450,
461 (Utah 1994), the interplay of these two statutes means that in order for the "in
concert" enhancement to apply, the co-perpetrators need not act with the same level of
criminal intent, or mens rea, as the defendant at bar; they need only act with some
minimally criminal mens rea.
Rasmussen argues, however, that in order for the "in concert"
enhancement to apply, the defendant at bar must act with a mens rea beyond that
24

required for the predicate crime(s). He or she must also have, he asserts, the additional
criminal intent to commit the crime "in concert" with the co-perpetrators. He argues
that section 76-3-203.1 "should not subject an individual to harsher punishment based
on the random acts of others." The statute is therefore unconstitutionally vague, he
concludes, because it does not specify an additional "in concert" mens rea in order for
the enhancement to apply (Br. of Appellant at 32).
This argument fails because Rasmussen did not present it to the trial court
(see R. 26-28, appendix II of this brief). Because Rasmussen alleges no exception to
the rule of waiver by default, this argument cannot be entertained on appeal. See State
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). The argument also fails because
Rasmussen does not show that the alleged error rendered section 76-3-203.1
unconstitutional as applied to him. Specifically, he does not claim that his coperpetrators acted "randomly," i.e., without his knowledge. Such a claim would be a
dubious one, given that the conduct included several burglaries and thefts, the conduct
appeared cooperatively planned (a co-perpetrator rented a storage unit for the stolen
goods), and one of the co-perpetrators confessed to the group's criminal activity (R. 710, 12).
Further, as a facial matter, Alvarez and State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497
(Utah 1989), counsel against Rasmussen's assertion that section 76-3-203.1 must
contain a mens rea requirement beyond that required for the predicate crime(s). In
25

Moore, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a statute that enhanced the penalty for illegal
drug dealing when committed within 1000 feet of a public school. The "within 1000
feet" element was a strict liability provision, requiring no knowledge of a school's
proximity. 782 P.2d at 504. Upholding the enhancement, the court found no due
process bar: "Utah law does not require that the aggravating element be accompanied
by a mens rea. Therefore, [the statute], which eliminates lack of knowledge about the
aggravating factor's presence as a defense for the enhanced penalty, does not violate
due process." Id. at 505.
Subsequently, in Alvarez, the court implicitly rejected the proposition that
in order for Utah's "in concert" enhancement to apply, the defendant's actions must be
attended by a mens rea to act in concert with others. The main holding in Alvarez, as
already explained, is that co-perpetrators need not act with an identical mens rea to the
defendant at bar in order for the enhancement to apply. However, the court in Alvarez
also observed that the defendant had been found guilty of the predicate offense, which
required a "knowing and intentional" mens rea, 872 P.2d at 462, thereby implying that
mens rea for the predicate offense is the only mens rea necessary in order for the "in
concert" enhancement to apply. That implication is consistent with the court's earlier
holding in Moore: so long as the predicate offense with its requisite mens rea is
established, an additional "enhancer" or "aggravator" does not require proof of an
additional mens rea element. Accordingly, even if Rasmussen's facial vagueness
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challenge about mens rea were properly before this Court, it would fail: the term "in
concert" does not require its own mens rea.
B.

Section 76-3-203.2 Adequately Guides Judicial Discretion.
Rasmussen next makes the surprising assertion that section 76-3-203.1

"utterly fails to constrain or guide" judicial discretion in its application (Br. of
Appellant at 34). Once more, because Rasmussen conceded the statute's applicability
in his case, he has no viable "as applied" challenge. And as a facial matter, reading
the statute reasonably and as a whole, his claim is without merit. As already explained,
subsection (l)(b) clearly defines "in concert," apprising both defendants and trial
judges of what is involved.
Next, subsection (5)(c) makes the enhancement contingent upon a written
"in concert" finding. Notwithstanding such finding, subsection (6)(a) provides that the
sentencing judge "may suspend" the enhancement "required under this section,"
provided that he or she state the reasons therefor (emphasis added). This language
cabins the sentencing judge's discretion by creating a presumption that once the "in
concert" condition is foxmd to exist, the enhancement will apply (it is "required"). The
enhancement can be suspended only if the judge makes an articulated determination that
the "interests of justice" support suspension. (Any vagueness in the term "interests of
justice" aids the defendant, who may utilize it to introduce broad mitigating evidence.)
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There is no constitutional problem with this rule. Utah courts have
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to Utah's three-tiered minimum
mandatory sentence scheme for certain offenses. Under that scheme, the middle of the
three available punishments applies, unless the sentencing judge articulates reasons to
impose the lowest or the highest minimum mandatory term. See Utah Code Ann. § 763-201(6) (Supp. 1995); State v. LovelU 758 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1988) (discretion is
granted under the three-tiered scheme); State v.Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987)
(three-tiered scheme is not vague). The similarly limited judicial discretion to impose
the "in concert" enhancement is therefore proper.
C.

The Statute Does Not Impair First Amendment Rights.
Rasmussen finally makes the frivolous allegation that the "in concert"

enhancement infringes upon First Amendment "associational" right-that is, "the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. Const. Amend. I. The foregoing First Amendment text, by itself,
defeats this claim. The amendment permits "peaceable" assembly, not assembly to
commit crimes. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951).
To the extent that Rasmussen really alleges "overbreadth"-* claim related
to vagueness, see State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah App. 1991) (Br. of
Appellant at 36)~his allegation also fails. A statute is overbroad if it proscribes, or
appears to proscribe, a substantial amount of conduct that is protected by the First
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Amendment. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984); State v. Murphy, 61A
P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983). Section 76-3-203.1 does not proscribe any protected
conduct, because it cannot apply until the defendant is found guilty of a predicate
criminal offense. Even then, the enhancement does not apply merely because the
defendant associates with a particular group of persons. Cf. Dawson v. Delaware, 503
U.S. 159 (1992) (membership in racist group, by itself, cannot be used to enhance
penalty). Further, under subsection (l)(b), the enhancement only applies if the
defendant acted with others who also "would be criminally liable as parties" to the
predicate offense. In fact, by avoiding any effort to criminalize "gang" association/?^
se, the statute avoids any risk of outlawing protected associational conduct. Therefore,
Rasmussen's First Amendment-based challenge, like his other attacks on the "in
concert" enhancement statute, should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Rasmussen's enhanced sentences should be
AFFIRMED. This Court should consider consolidating this appeal with State v.
Cheeney, No. 950720-CA, now also pending, which involves a similar challenge to
section 76-3-203.1 by one of Rasmussen's co-perpetrators. See Utah R. App. P. 3(b).
A published opinion appears appropriate to dispel any doubt about the constitutionality
of section 76-3-203.1. The State does not request oral argument.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
("In Concert" Sentence Enhancement)

76-3-203.1

CRIMINAL CODE

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) I n concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons,
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter S, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
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PUNISHMENTS

76-8*203.1

(k) anyfraudoffense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-604, 76-6-505, 76^-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(a) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communicationsfraudas defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
writtenfindingsof fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.
History: C. 1968,764-308.1, enacted by L. inent, effective May 2,1994, corrected tha ref1990, ch. 807,1 1; 1994, ch. 18,1 108.
erence in Subaaction (lXaX
Amendment Notes. —- The 1994 amendNOTES TO DECISIONS
of tha enhanced penalty as it was obliged to do
under this section, failure of defendant to object
findings of fact
to the enhanosment precluded consideration of
Menttl state of parties.
tha iaaue on appeal State * Labrum, 246 Utah
Adv.
Rap. U (Utah Ct App. 1994X
Findings of fact.
Even though tht trial court did not make Mental state of parties.
writtenfindingsof fact concerning applicability
For thia aection to apply, a defendant must
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
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VCV 60O0OC\T

Motion to Strike
Gang Enhancement
Statute

BRYAN RASMUSSEN,
Defendant.

Case No. 951900601FS
951900602FS,
951900600FS
Judge Frederick

The Utah gang enhancement statute imposes significantly
increased minimum sentences for several specified offenses, in
cases wherein the offenses are committed by at least three people
acting as accomplices.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1. A

copy of the statute and the legislative history of the statute is
attached to this memo.
It is Mr. Rasmussen's position that the gang enhancement
statute is unconstitutional in four main respects: the statute
fails to adequately channel prosecutorial and judicial
discretion; the statute fails to meet the legislative purpose in
a rational manner; the statute impinges on various rights unique
to criminal defendants; and the statute is too vague to forewarn
citizens about the criminal consequences of their actions.

^ trrai

1- Vagueness - failure to channel prosecutorial and judicial
discretion
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws
which are sufficiently definite to confine the discretion of law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges.
Lawson. 461 U.S. 352

(1983).

Kolendar v.

Laws must be sufficiently narrow

in scope that police officer, prosecutors and judges are not
allowed to discriminate in their application.

E.g. Constitution

of Utah, Article I section 2, Article I section 24 (equal
protection, uniform operation of laws provisions).

Courts are

especially careful to scrutinize legislation which might impinge
on basic First Amendment freedoms such as freedom of speech,
rights to assembly and rights to association.

IcL

See also

Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 (defining similar but
different rights under Utah Constitution). Under Utah
Constitutional standards, it is extremely important for the
legislature to narrow the scope of criminal statutes, so that
laws do not delegate the legislative function to actors from
other government branches. E.g. Constitution of Utah, Article V
section 1 (separation of powers provision).
The gang enhancement statute allows prosecutors exceedingly
broad authority to charge the gang enhancement because the
statute applies regardless of whether the parties other than the
defendant are even identified, let alone prosecuted
commensurately with the defendant.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-

203.1(5)(b).
The gang enhancement statute gives judges virtually unbridled
discretion to decide which enhanceable offenses are actually

00002

punished under the enhancement, by allowing the suspension of the
gang enhancement if the judge finds that the interests of justice
are served thereby, and states findings on the record to such
effect.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(6).

As is true of all vague laws, the vague provisions of the gang
enhancement statute can be used improperly by government actors
who might be consciously or subconsciously inclined to
discriminate against certain classes of individuals, or to
impinge upon citizens' rights to association, free speech, and
other related rights.
104, 108-109 (1972).

E.g. Grayned v. Citv of Rockford, 408 U.S.
Inasmuch as the courts are empowered to

protect those most vulnerable to governmental discrimination and overreaching, see United States v. Carolene Products Company, 3 04
U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938), this Court should use its authority
to strike the gang enhancement statute.
2. Due process - lack of rational relationship between law and
legislative goal
Under Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
legislation must meet the legislative purpose in a rational
manner.

State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) . A review

of the legislative history of the gang enhancement statute
demonstrates that the legislature intentionally enacted statutory
language designed by its drafters to obfuscate the legislative
intent, and that the legislature included the broad judicial
discretion provision as the mechanism whereby the statute would
hopefully apply as intended.
The legislative purpose of the gang enhancement statute was to
deter hard core California gang members from migrating to Utah to

franchise crack cocaine.

Legislative history, at 1-9.

It is

readily apparent to anyone reading the language of the statute
that the actual applicability of the statute is far different
from that intended by the legislature.

Review of the legislative

history explains the discrepancy and highlights the
unconstitutionality of the provision.
The drafters of the statute omitted explicit reference to
gangs or the real purpose of the statute in the statutory
language, in hopes of avoiding constitutional challenges to the
statute.

Legislative history at 2-3, 8-9.

The legislative

history demonstrates that the legislature was counting on the
judiciary to apply the statute in a manner as to effectuate the
true legislative intent.

The legislators participating in the

debate on the statute indicated their concern that the gang
enhancement should only apply to true gang members, rather than
to non-gang-related crimes involving multiple participants.

The

sponsor of the bill informed them that that concern was addressed
in the section of the statute giving total discretion to judges
on the applicability of the statute.

Legislative history at 6.

Because the gang enhancement statute does not meet the
legislative purpose in a rational manner, but in fact relies on
an unconstitutional judicial discretion provision to effectuate
legislative intent, this Court should strike the statute.
3. Impingement on rights of criminal defendants
The gang enhancement statute purports to allow for the
imposition of significant minimum terms of imprisonment for
specific criminal conduct, while explicitly evading numerous
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standard constitutional rights of criminal defendants, including
the right to a preliminary hearing for a determination of
probable cause, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 13;
the right to a trial by jury, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article
I section 12/ and the right to a finding of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, e.g. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
The legislature should not be allowed to create such extreme
punitive consequences for criminal conduct, in circumvention of
these fundamental rights.
The fact that the legislature characterizes the statute as
creating "enhancements," rather than as defining offenses, Utah
Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(5) (a), should not override
fundamental constitutional rights of criminal defendants.1
Section 76-3-203.1 purports to penalize stated criminal acts
combined with specified mental states, and as such, the statute
defines offenses.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-101 et seq.

See

also State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982)(recognizing
that "enhancement" statute actually defined elements of a crime,
which should be assessed by a jury).

Because the statute

attempts to circumvent constitutional rights to preliminary
hearings, jury trials, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this
Court should strike the statute.
4. Vagueness - lack of warning to citizens
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws
1

The Utah Supreme Court has already differed with
legislature's
characterization
of
the
provision
as
an
"enhancement."
In State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994) , the
court noted that the provision creates minimum mandatory sentences,
rather than true enhancements.
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which are sufficiently clear to inform citizens about how to
conform their conduct to the law.

E.g. United States

Constitution, Amendment XIV; Gravned v. Citv of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972).
Mr. Rasmussen concedes that the average citizen likely has
knowledge of the unlawful nature of the conduct encompassed in
the offenses subject to enhancement and listed under subsection
(4).

However, the average citizen is unlikely to know whether

the conduct at issue is subject to such extreme sentencing
enhancement because the statute grants virtually unlimited
discretion to the judge to determine whether the enhancement
applies.

See Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(6) (allowing the

judge to suspend the application of the gang enhancement as long
as the judge finds that "the interests of justice would be best
served" and states findings to this effect on the record).
The broad applicability of the enhancement compounds the risk
that the average citizen would have little forewarning as to the
applicability of the enhancement.

See Utah Code Ann. section 76-

3-203.1 (5) (b) (the statute applies regardless of whether the
other person(s) acting in concert with the defendant "are not
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of
those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or
lesser offense.11).

The Utah appellate courts interpret the

statute as applying regardless of whether the parties share the
same mens rea.

State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994);

State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 905 n.9 (Utah App. 1994).

This

further promotes the possibility that someone could suffer the

consequences of the gang enhancement statute without fair
forewarning.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should strike Utah Code
Ann. section 76-3-203.1.
Respectfully submitted this *?& day of /?**.'/,

1995.

JUDITH A. JENSEN
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this motion
to Deputy District Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 this 2>0

day of QjQAjJi 1995.

7

G0002S

